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Second, we propose a methodology that allows to analyze the equilibrium in a decen-
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sum of its marginal profitabilities in all sectors using it). Moreover, the two types
of market failures arising in our setting, i.e. the pollution from fossil resource use
and the incomplete appropriability of surplus in research activities, are corrected by
two economic policy instruments: a carbon tax and a research subsidy for each R&D
sector. Third, we determine the optimal policies. Finally, we illustrate the theoretical
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1 Introduction
Emerging energy technologies, such as clean coal or renewable energy, are crucial for a cost-
effective climate change mitigation policy. The relevant appraisal of a climate policy should
thus include the appropriate incentives for R&D investments in carbon-free energies that
will drive the substantial technical improvements necessary to their large scale deployment1
(see Energy Journal, 2006, Special issue on endogenous technical change and the economics
of atmospheric stabilization). The strand of literature on economic growth and climate
change contains mostly optimization models (see for instance Bosetti et al., 2006; Edenhofer
et al., 2005, 2006; Gerlagh 2006; Gerlagh and Van Der Zwaan 2006; Popp, 2004, 2006a,
2006b). The more often in those models, the analysis focuses on the optimal trajectories
together with the system of prices and economic policies that implements the optimum. A
complementary approach to these questions consists in characterizing the equilibrium in
the associated decentralized economy, as suggested for instance by Edenhofer et al. (2006)
who writes: "Therefore, designing a general intertemporal equilibrium version of MIND
for a comparison with the social planner solution would be the natural next step".
The study of the decentralized economy offers one major advantage: it allows for the
entire characterization of the continuum of all existing equilibria and not only the optimal
one. Indeed, a particular equilibrium is associated with each feasible vector of policy
instruments. The approach followed in this paper gives some insights on how the economy
reacts to policy changes: when the economy faces one or several market failures, e.g.
pollution or insufficient research effort, this characterization of market equilibria reveals
crucial for measuring the impacts of economic tools such as environmental taxes, pollution
permits or research subsidies. Because of budgetary, socioeconomic or political constraints,
the enforcement of first best optimum is usually difficult to achieve for the policy-maker
that would rather implement second-best solutions. For instance, Hart (2007) examines
what should be the second-best carbon tax if research subsidies were below their first-best
levels.
The objective of this paper is to complete the literature mentioned above by setting up
a general equilibrium analysis, that includes explicitly both the optimal outcome and the
decentralized equilibrium. However, the main difficulty of this approach lies in the way the
research activity is modeled, in particular the type of innovation goods which are developed
1In 2004, wind and solar energy represented roughly 0.4% of world energy supply (IEA, 2006).
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as well as their pricing. In the standard endogenous growth theory (Aghion and Howitt,
1998; Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991), when an innovation is produced, it
is associated with a particular intermediate good. Research is funded by the monopoly
profits of intermediate producers who benefit from an exclusive right, like a patent, for the
production and the sale of these goods. However, this methodology has two inconvenients.
Firstly, the more often, embodying knowledge into intermediate goods becomes inextricable
in more general computable endogenous growth models with pollution and/or natural
resources such as the ones previously mentioned. In addition, those technical difficulties
are emphasized when dealing with several research sectors, i.e. when there are several
types of specific knowledge, each of them being dedicated to a particular input (resource,
labor, capital, backstop...) as it is proposed in Acemoglu (2002). Secondly, new pieces of
knowledge, or new ideas, are not necessary associated with tangible intermediate goods.
In particular, in new technology sectors as biotechnology or software industries, they are
directly embodied into non-tangible goods that Quah (2001) and Scotchmer (2005) call
knowledge goods, or information goods. As clearly explained in Scotchmer (2005)2, these
goods have the same property as knowledge: there are non rival. That is why databases,
softwares, business plans, ..., are today directly protected by intellectual property rights.
To circumvent those obstacles, we assume the absence of tangible intermediate goods
in research sectors, as it is done for instance by Gerlagh and Lise (2005), Edenhofer et
al. (2006) and Popp (2004, 2006a). Therefore, in an equilibrium framework, it reveals
necessary to directly price pieces of knowledge. To do it, we formalize ideas previously
developed by Arrow (1962), Tirole (1988), Scotchmer (1991), Gallini and Scotchmer (2003)
for instance. More recently, Grimaud and Rougé (2005)3 have adapted such a formalization
in growth models with polluting resources and environmental concerns. Based on this
literature, we propose a method that consists in three points.
First, we define the optimal price of one unit of specific knowledge (associated with the
energy or backstop R&D sectors) as the sum of the marginal profitabilities of this unit in
each sector using this specific knowledge: this is the social value of an innovation.
Second, by referring to several empirical studies (see for instance Jones, 1995; Jones
and Williams, 1998; Popp, 2004, 2006a), we assume that, in the decentralized economy, the
2"By information goods, we usually mean computer software and entertainment products stored in
digital form, such as music. Information goods have a feature that sets them apart from ordinary private
goods. They are public goods in the technical sense meant by economists: use by one person does not
preclude the use by any other person and does not cost additional resources, except the small cost of
distributing them. That is, the use of such good is non rival."
3See also Grimaud and Tournemaine (2007).
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equilibrium price of knowledge is in fact equal to a given proportion of this optimal value,
usually on the order of a quarter to a third. This is justified in the standard literature by
the presence of several distortions that prevent the decentralized equilibrium to implement
the first-best optimum. Jones and Williams (2000) count four of them. i) the duplication
effect : the R&D sector does not account for the redundancy of some research projects;
ii) the intertemporal spillover effect : inventors do not account for that ideas they produce
are used to produce new ideas; iii) the appropriability effect : inventors appropriate only a
part of the social value they create; iv) the creative-destruction effect. The overall effect of
those distortions causes the market value of an innovation to be lower than the social one.
Third, we assume that the R&D sectors can be subsidized in order to reduce the gap
between these social and market values4.
We develop an endogenous growth model in which energy services can be produced from
a polluting non-renewable resource as well as a clean backstop. As in Popp (2006a), we
introduce two R&D sectors, the first one improving the efficiency of energy production and
the second one, the efficiency of the backstop. With this respect, we have to consider two
types of market failures: the pollution from fossil resource consumption and the research
spillovers in each R&D sector. That is why, in the decentralized equilibrium, we introduce
two kinds of economic policy instruments in accordance: a tax on the fossil fuel use5 and
a research subsidy for the energy and backstop R&D sectors. There is an equilibrium
associated to each vector of instruments, which allows to study the impact of one or
several policy changes on the equilibrium trajectories. Clearly, when public instruments
are optimally set, the equilibrium of the decentralized economy coincides with the first
best optimum.
We illustrate our methodology by using the ENTICE-BR model (Popp, 2006b) and we
find three main streams of results. First, the fact that the optimal policy instruments,
which have been computed analytically, implement numerically the optimal trajectories
confirms the consistency of the equilibrium concept used here, in particular regarding the
4According to the OECD Science, Technology and R&D Statistics, publicly-funded energy R&D in
2004 among OECD countries amounted to 9.72 billion US$, which represented 4% of overall public R&D
budgets. In the United States, energy investments from the private sector have shrunk during the last
decade; governmental funding currently represents 76% of total US energy R&D expenditures (Nemet and
Kammen, 2007).
5Fischer et al. (2003) and Nordhaus (2006) analyze the relative advantage of such a carbon tax as
compared to a tradable emission permit system. In an earlier paper, Pizer (2002) argues that, when
uncertainties about climate change mitigation costs are accounted for, price controls are much more efficient
as long as damages are not too abrupt.
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computation of the social values of innovations for each R&D sector. Second, the numerical
comparison of the optimum and the equilibrium situation of "laisser-faire" allows us to
measure the impact of the optimal instruments on the vector of prices and quantities of all
economic sectors. In addition, since the analysis is undertaken at a decentralized level, we
are able to dissociate those effects according to the various sectors: energy, backstop, fossil
fuel, R&D. Third, our methodology renders possible the impact study of any economic
policy on all variables, prices and quantities. In particular, we isolate the effects of the
environmental policy from the ones of the research policies and vice versa. For instance,
we show that an increase in the carbon tax has insignificant effect on the R&D activities.
It reduces the flow of fossil fuel extraction and stimulates the backstop penetration. It also
implies a rent transfer from the resource-holders to the government. Moreover, a research
policy in a given R&D sector increases knowledge accumulation in this sector, but has
no effect on the level of knowledge in the other R&D sector. Whatever the R&D sector,
granting research always reduces the fossil fuel extraction and increases the backstop use.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. In section
3, we determine the optimal solutions owing to five characterizing conditions. Section 4
studies the decentralized economy. We first analyze the behavior of each agent in the
economy. Next, we characterize the equilibrium solutions owing to five conditions and we
compute the equilibrium prices for any policy levels. In section 5, we implement the first
best optimum by comparing the two corresponding sets of characterizing conditions, which
allows us to determine the optimal policies. In section 6, we derive a selection of numeric
results focusing on i) the simultaneous effects of all the optimal policies (i.e. comparison
between the optimum and the "laisser-faire" equilibrium), and ii) the differentiated effects
of one policy, the other ones being given6. We conclude in section 7.
2 The model
We consider an economy in which, at each time t, a quantity QGt of a homogeneous good
is produced according to the following technology:
QGt = Q(Kt, Et, Lt, At), (1)
where Kt is the amount of physical capital used within the production process, Et is the
flow of energy services, Lt, Lt ≡ L0e
∫ t
0 gL,sds, denotes labor and At, At ≡ A0e
∫ t
0 gA,sds, is an
6The functional specifications used for numerical computations are provided in the appendix.
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efficiency index that measures the total productivity of factors. Growth rates gL,t and gA,t
are exogenously given. Since, as we will see later, climate change affects global income and
not utility, QGt is in fact the final output that we would get without any environmental
damage, i.e. the gross output. Function Q(.) is assumed to be increasing and concave in
each of his arguments and exhibits constant returns to scale.
As in Popp (2006a), production of energy services requires some specific knowledge
HE,t, fossil fuels Ft and a backstop energy source Bt:
Et = E(HE,t, Ft, Bt). (2)
Production function E(.) is increasing and concave in each argument and the backstop and
the fossil fuel are supposed to be imperfect substitutes. HE,t represents a stock of specific
technological knowledge dedicated to energy production process7.
The fossil fuel end product is obtained from some carbon-based non-renewable resource
and some specific investment8:
Ft = F (QF,t, Zt), (3)
where QF,t is the amount of final product devoted to the production of fossil fuel and Zt,
Zt ≡
∫ t
0 Fsds, is the cumulative extraction of the exhaustible resource from the initial date
up to t. We assume that function F (.) is increasing and concave in QF , decreasing and
convex in Z, and that the fossil fuel extraction is constrained by a ceiling Z¯: Zt ≤ Z¯,
∀t ≥ 0.9
The backstop resource is produced from specific investment and knowledge:
Bt = B(QB,t, HB,t), (4)
where B(.) is an increasing and concave function in QB,t, the amount of final product
7In a model "à la Romer" with tangible intermediate goods, (2) would write Et =
E
[∫ HE,t
0
f(xEj,t)dj, Ft, Bt
]
, where xEj,t is the jth intermediate good and f(.) is an increasing and strictly
concave function.
8An appreciable difference with the DICE stream of models lies in the definition of such a production
function which, in fact, replaces the cost (or price) function of the fossil fuel. In Nordhaus and Boyer
(2000) or in Popp (2004, 2006a), such a full cost function is equal to the full extraction cost augmented
by the scarcity rent that depends on Zt. By making this transformation, this utility/technology canonical
model allows for an endogenous determination of the resource market price when solving the equilibrium
(see section 4 below). However, we will analytically specify function F (.) in such a way that there exists a
correspondence with the cost function mentioned above and such that the calibration of the DICE model
still applies.
9Here, the capacity constraint of the exhaustible resource is not characterized by the limited availability
of initial stocks, but by the decreasing relationship between the flow of produced fossil fuel and the amount
of resource that has already been extracted. Then, resource scarcity is not physically but economically
captured.
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that is devoted to the backstop production sector, and in HB,t, the stock of knowledge
pertaining to the backstop10.
In this model, there are two stocks of knowledge, HE and HB, each associated with a
specific R&D sector (i.e. the energy and the backstop ones). Here, in the energy (resp.
the backstop) R&D sector, we consider that each innovation is a non-rival, indivisible
and infinitely durable good which is simultaneously used by the energy (resp. backstop)
production sector and by the R&D sector in question. Formally, it is a point on the segment
[0, HE,t] (resp. [0, HB,t]). We now specify the dynamics of these two stocks. At each time
t, the stock of knowledge in sector i, i = {B,E}, evolves as follows:
H˙i,t = H i(Ri,t, Hi,t), (5)
where Ri,t is the R&D investment into sector i, i.e. the amount of final output that is
devoted to R&D sector i, and H i(.) an innovation function assumed to be increasing and
concave in each argument. Then, the stock of knowledge Hi,t increases due to increases in
R&D effort and in already accumulated knowledge.
Pollution is generated by fossil fuel use. Let α be the unitary carbon content of fossil
fuel such that, without any abatement policy, the carbon flow released into the atmosphere
would be equal to αFt. Let G0 be the stock of carbon in the atmosphere at the beginning
of the planning period, Gt the stock at time t and ζ, ζ > 0, the natural rate of decay, so
that11:
G˙t = αFt − ζGt. (6)
As in the DICE model (see also Farzin and Tahvonen, 1996), the atmospheric carbon
concentration does not directly enter the damage function. In fact, the increase in car-
bon concentration drives the global mean temperature away from a given state – here the
1990 level – and the difference between this state and the present global mean tempera-
ture should be taken as an index of climate change. Let Tt denote this difference, whose
dynamics is governed by the following state equation:
T˙t = Φ(Gt)−mTt, (7)
10Again, in a model with tangible intermediate goods, (4) would write Bt = B
[
QB,t,
∫HB,t
0
g(xBi,t)di
]
.
11In the analytical treatment of the model, we assume for the sake of clarity that the emission and
natural decay rates are constant, despite what the DICE model recommends. However, in the numerical
simulations, we adopt the carbon cycle characterization from DICE, that represents the carbon enhances
between the oceans and the atmosphere. Based on Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), Goulder and Mathai (2000)
estimate parameters α and ζ that take into account the inertia of the climatic system. They state that
only 64% of current emissions actually contribute to the augmentation of atmospheric CO2 and that the
portion of current CO2 concentration in excess is removed naturally at a rate of 0.8% per year.
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where Φ(.) is an increasing and concave function that links the atmospheric carbon con-
centration to the dynamics of temperature (i.e. the radiative forcing as characterized in
Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000) and m, m > 0, is a constant parameter12.
Damage affects society through the global income. We denote by D(Tt) the instanta-
neous penalty rate induced by temperature increases, with D′(Tt) < 0. The net output,
QNt , when taking into account climate change effects is:
QNt = D(Tt)×QGt , (8)
The final output is devoted to either aggregated consumption Ct, fossil fuel production
QF,t, backstop production QB,t, investment in physical capital It or in the two R&D sectors
RE,t and RB,t:
QNt = Ct +QF,t +QB,t + It +RE,t +RB,t. (9)
The dynamic equation of the physical capital stock is:
K˙t = It − δKt, (10)
where δ, δ > 0, is the capital depreciation rate.
Finally, the social welfare function Wt is defined as:
Wt =
∫ t
0
U(Cs)e−
∫ s
0 ρτdτds =
∫ t
0
Lsu(cs)e−
∫ s
0 ρτdτds, (11)
where ρt, ρt ≡ ρ0e−gρt, is the instantaneous social rate of time preferences, gρ is the
constant declining rate of ρt, U(Ct) is the instantaneous utility function from aggregated
consumption, ct ≡ Ct/Lt is the per capita consumption and u(ct) is the per capita in-
stantaneous utility function. As usual, functions U(.) and u(.) are increasing, concave and
satisfy Inada conditions. The model is summarized in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 here]
To conduct numerical simulations, we assign functional specifications to the utility and
technological functions so as to obtain a calibrated model. Those functional forms are
listed in Appendix A1.
12As for the dynamics of the atmospheric carbon stock, the state equation (7) replaces in fact a more
complex and general set of dynamic equations which considers two measures of temperature – the atmo-
spheric temperature and the lower oceanic one – and the interactions between both. Kriegler and Bruckner
(2004) have recourse to such simplified dynamics by using a log function for Φ and by estimating the associ-
ated parameter m. However, for numerical simulations, we keep the DICE formulation that fully describes
temperature variations.
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3 Welfare analysis
The social planner problem consists in choosing {Ct, QF,t, QB,t, RE,t, RB,t}∞t=0 that max-
imizes W∞, as defined by (11), subject to constraints (1)-(10). After eliminating the
co-state variables, the first order conditions reduce to the five characteristic conditions of
Proposition 1 below, which hold at each time t.
Proposition 1 At each time t, an optimum is characterized by the following five condi-
tions: [
D(Tt)QEEF − 1
FQF
]
U ′(Ct)e−
∫ t
0 ρsds +
∫ ∞
t
FZ
FQF
U ′(Cs)e−
∫ s
0 ρxdxds
+α
∫ ∞
t
[∫ ∞
s
D′(Tx)QxU ′(Cx)e−[m(x−s)+
∫ x
0 ρydy]dx
]
Φ′(Gs)e−ζ(s−t)ds = 0 (12)
D(Tt)QEEBBQB = 1 (13)
D(Tt)QK − δ = ρt − U˙
′(Ct)
U ′(Ct)
(14)
HBHB +
HBRBBHB
BQB
− H˙
B
RB
HBRB
= ρt − U˙
′(Ct)
U ′(Ct)
(15)
HEHE +
HEREEHE
EBBQB
− H˙
E
RE
HERE
= ρt − U˙
′(Ct)
U ′(Ct)
(16)
where JX stands for the partial derivative of function J(.) with respect to X.
Proof. See Appendix A2.
Equation (12) reads as a particular version of the Hotelling rule in this model, which
takes into account the carbon accumulation in the atmosphere, the dynamics of tempera-
tures and their effects on output. We will see later (cf. equation (38) in Proposition 2) that
this equation allows for the computation of the optimal tax on the fossil fuel. Equation
(13) tells that the marginal productivity of specific input QB,t equals its marginal cost.
The three last equations are Keynes-Ramsey conditions. Equation (14) characterizes the
optimal trade-off between physical capital Kt and consumption Ct, as in more standard
growth models. Equation (15) (resp. (16)) characterizes the same kind of optimal trade-off
between specific investment into backstop R&D sector, RB,t (resp. energy R&D sector,
RE,t) and consumption.
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4 Decentralized equilibrium
In the decentralized economy, we assume that all sectors, except R&D sectors, are perfectly
competitive. The price of output QNt is normalized to one and pF,t, pB,t, pE,t, wt and rt are
the prices at date t of fossil fuel, backstop, energy, labor and the interest rate on financial
market, respectively. We also assume that the representative household holds capital and
rents it to the final good producer at a rental price Rt. Standard arbitrage conditions
imply Rt = rt + δ. Moreover, in order to correct the two types of distortions involved by
the model (pollution and research spillovers in each R&D sector), we introduce two types
of policy tools: an environmental tax, τt, on the resource use and two subsidies, σB,t and
σE,t, for the backstop and energy research sectors, respectively.
4.1 Behavior of agents
4.1.1 The final good sector
At each time t, the firm chooses {Kt, Et, Lt}∞t=0 that maximizes its profit function ΠQt =
D(Tt)QGt − pE,tEt − wtLt − (rt + δ)Kt, subject to (1). The first order conditions are:
∂ΠQt
∂Kt
= 0 ⇒ rt = D(Tt)QK − δ (17)
∂ΠQt
∂Et
= 0 ⇒ pE,t = D(Tt)QE (18)
∂ΠQt
∂Lt
= 0 ⇒ wt = D(Tt)QL. (19)
4.1.2 The energy sector
At each time t, the energy producer maximizes ΠEt =
[
pE,tEt − pmF,tFt − pB,tBt
]
subject
to (2), where pmF,t is the fossil fuel market price, i.e. the price which is paid by the firm
and which includes the environmental tax τt. This tariff is assumed to be additive: pmF,t =
psF,t + τt. However, our results can easily be extended to the case of an ad-valorem tax τ
a
t :
pmF,t = p
s
F,t(1 + τ
a
t ). The first order conditions write:
∂ΠEt
∂Ft
= 0 ⇒ pE,t =
pmF,t
EF
=
psF,t + τt
EF
(20)
∂ΠEt
∂Bt
= 0 ⇒ pE,t = pB,t
EB
. (21)
Those conditions determine respectively the inverse demand functions for fossil fuel and
backstop.
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4.1.3 The fossil resource sector
The program of the fossil fuel producer writes:
max
{QF ,t≥0}
∫ ∞
0
(
psF,tFt −QF,t
)
e−
∫ t
0 rsdsdt s.t. (3) and Zt =
∫ t
0
Fsds,
where psF,t denotes the selling price of the fossil resource, i.e. the price which is received by
the resource-holder and which thus does not include the carbon tax. Static and dynamic
first order conditions are:
(psF,tFQF − 1)e−
∫ t
0 rsds + ηtFQF = 0 (22)
psF,tFZe
− ∫ t0 rsds + ηtFZ = −η˙t, (23)
together with the transversality condition limt→∞ ηtZt = 0. Replacing pF into (23) by its
expression coming from (22), it comes:
η˙t = − FZ
FQF
e−
∫ t
0 rsds. (24)
By integrating (24) and using (22) again, we find:
ηt =
∫ ∞
t
FZ
FQF
e−
∫ s
0 rududs (25)
and then:
psF,t =
1
FQF
−
∫ ∞
t
FZ
FQF
e−
∫ s
t rduds. (26)
4.1.4 The backstop sector
At each time t, the backstop producer maximizes its profit ΠBt = [pB,tBt −QB,t], subject
to technological constraint (4). The first order condition determines, for each time t, the
inverse demand function for specific investment QB,t:
pB,t =
1
BQB
. (27)
4.1.5 The R&D sectors
We have seen (cf. section 2) that each innovation is a non-rival, indivisible and infinitely
durable piece of knowledge. Since it is not embodied into tangible intermediate goods,
it cannot be financed by the sale of these goods. However, in order to fully describe the
equilibrium, we need to find a way to assess the price received by the inventor for each
piece of knowledge. We use a method that consists in three points. i) In each research
sector, we determine the social value of an innovation. Since an innovation is a public
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good, this social value is the sum of marginal profitabilities of this innovation in all sectors
which use it. If the inventor was able to extract the willingness to pay of each user, he
would receive this social value and the first best optimum would be implemented13. ii) In
reality, as mentioned in introduction, there are some distortions that constrain the inventor
to extract only a part of this social value14. This implies that the market value (without
subsidy) is lower than the social one. iii) The research sectors are eventually subsidized in
order to reduce the gap between the social and the market values of innovations.
Let us apply this three-steps procedure to the energy R&D sector, for instance. Each
innovation produced by this sector is used by the sector itself as well as by the energy
sector. Thus, at each date t, the instantaneous social value of this innovation is v¯HE ,t =
vEHE ,t+v
HE
HE ,t
, where vEHE ,t and v
HE
HE ,t
are the marginal profitabilities of this innovation in the
energy production sector and in the energy R&D sector, respectively. The social value of
this innovation at t is V¯HE ,t =
∫∞
t v¯HE ,se
− ∫ st rxdxds. We assume that, without any public
intervention, only a share γE of the social value is paid to the innovator, with 0 < γE < 1.
However, the government can decide to grant this R&D sector by applying a non-negative
subsidy rate σE,t. Note that if σE,t = 1 − γE , the market value matches the social one.
The instantaneous market value (including subsidy) is:
vHE ,t = (γE + σE,t)v¯HE ,t, (28)
and the market value at date t is:
VHE ,t =
∫ ∞
t
vHE ,se
− ∫ st rxdxds. (29)
By analogy, the instantaneous social value of an innovation in the backstop R&D
sector is v¯HB ,t = v
B
HB ,t
+ vHBHB ,t, where v
B
HB ,t
and vHBHB ,t are the marginal profitabilities
of an innovation in the backstop sector and in the backstop R&D sector, respectively.
Then, V¯HB ,t =
∫∞
t v¯HB ,se
− ∫ st rxdxds is the social value of an innovation at date t, and
VHB ,t =
∫∞
t vHB ,se
− ∫ st rxdxds is the market value (including subsidy), in which vHB ,t =
(γB + σB,t)v¯HB ,t, with 0 < γB < 1 and σB,t ≥ 0. Here also, if σB,t = 1 − γB, the market
value and the social one coincide. Note that differentiating (29) (and the corresponding
equation for VHB ,t) with respect to time leads to the usual arbitrage relation:
rt =
V˙Hi,t
VHi,t
+
vHi,t
VHi,t
, ∀i = {B,E} , (30)
13This result will be proved by Proposition 3 below. In fact, what we call social value is the sum of the
Lindahl prices associated with the innovations.
14For instance, Jones and Williams, 1998, estimate that actual investment in research are at least four
times below what would be socially optimal; on this point, see also Popp, 2006a.
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which reads as the equality between the rate of return on the financial market and the rate
of return on the R&D sector i.
We can now analyze the behaviors of the R&D sectors. At each time t, each sector
i, i = {B,E}, supplies the flow of innovations H˙i,t at price VHi,t and demands some
specific investment Ri,t at price 1, so that the profit function to be maximized is ΠHit =
VHi,tH
i(Ri,t, Hi,t)−Ri,t. The first order condition implies:
∂ΠHit
∂Ri,t
= 0 ⇒ VHi,t =
1
H iRi
. (31)
The marginal profitability for specific knowledge of R&D sector i is:
vHiHi,t =
∂ΠHit
∂Hi,t
= VHi,tH
i
Hi =
H iHi
H iRi
, ∀i = {B,E} . (32)
Finally, in order to determine the social and the market values of an innovation in both
research sectors, we need to know the marginal profitabilities of innovations in the energy
and backstop production sectors. From (21) and (27), those values are given by:
vEHE ,t =
∂ΠEt
∂HE,t
=
EHE
EBBQB
, (33)
vBHB ,t =
∂ΠBt
∂HB,t
=
BHB
BQB
. (34)
Therefore, the instantaneous market values (including subsidies) of innovations are:
vHE ,t = (γE + σE,t)
(
∂ΠEt
∂HE,t
+
∂ΠHEt
∂HE,t
)
= (γE + σE,t)
[
EHE
EBBQB
+
HEHE
HERE
]
(35)
and
vHB ,t = (γB + σB,t)
(
∂ΠBt
∂HB,t
+
∂ΠHBt
∂HB,t
)
= (γB + σB,t)
[
BHB
BQB
+
HBHB
HBRB
]
. (36)
4.1.6 The household and the government
The representative household maximizes W∞ subject to the following dynamic budget
constraint: K˙t = rKt + wtLt + Πt − Ct − T at , where Πt is the total profits gained in the
economy (including the resource rent) at time t and T at is a lump-sum tax (subsidy free)
that allows to balance the budget constraint of the government. This maximization leads
to the following condition:
ρt − U˙
′(Ct)
U ′(Ct)
= rt ⇒ U ′(Ct) = U ′(C0)e
∫ t
0 (ρs−rs)ds. (37)
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Finally, assuming that the government’s budget constraint holds at each time t, then
it writes:
T at + τtFt =
(
σB,t
γB + σB,t
)
VHB ,tH˙B,t +
(
σE,t
γE + σE,t
)
VHE ,tH˙E,t.
4.2 Characterization of the decentralized equilibrium
From the previous analysis of individual behaviors, we can now characterize an equilibrium
in the decentralized economy, which is done by the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 For a given triplet of policies {σB,t, σE,t, τt}∞t=0, the equilibrium conditions
can be summed up as follows:[
D(Tt)QEEF − τt − 1
FQF
]
U ′(Ct)e−
∫ t
0 ρsds +
∫ ∞
t
FZ
FQF
U ′(Cs)e−
∫ s
0 ρxdxds = 0 (38)
D(Tt)QEEBBQB = 1 (39)
D(Tt)QK − δ = ρt − U˙
′(Ct)
U ′(Ct)
(40)
−H˙
B
RB
HBRB
+ (γB + σB,t)
[
BHBH
B
RB
BQB
+HBHB
]
= ρt − U˙
′(Ct)
U ′(Ct)
(41)
−H˙
E
RE
HERE
+ (γE + σE,t)
[
EHEH
E
RE
EBBQB
+HEHE
]
= ρt − U˙
′(Ct)
U ′(Ct)
(42)
and the equilibrium corresponding prices are:
r∗t = D(Tt)QK − δ (43)
w∗t = D(Tt)QL (44)
ps∗F,t =
1
FQF
−
∫ ∞
t
FZ
FQF
e−
∫ s
t rxdxds (45)
p∗B,t =
1
BQB
(46)
p∗E,t =
ps∗F,t + τt
EF
=
p∗B,t
EB
= D(Tt)QE (47)
v∗HB ,t = (γB + σB,t)
[
BHB
BQB
+
HBHB
HBRB
]
; V ∗HB ,t =
1
HBRB
(48)
v∗HE ,t = (γE + σE,t)
[
EHE
EBBQB
+
HEHE
HERE
]
; V ∗HE ,t =
1
HERE
. (49)
Proof. See Appendix A3.
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Equations (38)-(42) are related to the quantities QF,t, QB,t, It, RB,t and RE,t, respec-
tively. They have to be compared one by one to equations (12)-(16) of Proposition 1 which
characterize the optimum. In particular, by analyzing condition (38) and the optimal cor-
responding one (12), we will be able to compute the tax that implements the first best
optimum (see next section). Equation (43) gives the interest rate and equations (44)-(49),
the equilibrium prices of Lt, Ft, Et, HB,t and HE,t, respectively. A particular equilibrium is
associated to a given triplet of policies {σB,t, σE,t, τt}∞t=0 and the set of equations given by
Proposition 2 allows to compute quantities and prices for this equilibrium. If the triplet of
policy tools is optimal, this set of equations gives the same quantities as the ones obtained
from Proposition 1; it also gives the first best prices.
5 Implementation of the optimum
5.1 Determination of the first-best optimal policies
Recall that for a given set of public policies, a particular equilibrium is characterized by
conditions (38)-(42) of Proposition 2. This equilibrium will be said to be optimal if it satis-
fies the optimum characterizing conditions (12)-(16) of Proposition 1. By analogy between
these two sets of conditions, we can show that there exists a single triplet {σB,t, σE,t, τt}∞t=0
that implements the optimum.
Since conditions (13) and (14) have the same expressions as (39) and (40) respectively,
we only have to compare the three remaining conditions of each proposition. First, by
identifying (12) to (38) and using (37), the level of the additive environmental tax that
implements the optimum – referred to as the first-best optimal tax from now on – is defined
by:
τ ot = −
α
U ′(Ct)
{∫ ∞
t
Φ′(Gt)e−ζ(s−t)
[∫ ∞
s
D′(Tx)QxU ′(Cx)e−m(x−t)−
∫ x
t ρydydx
]
ds
}
.
(50)
The interpretation of (50) is quite standard. This expression reads as the ratio between
the marginal social cost of climate change – the marginal damage in terms of utility com-
ing from the consumption of an additional unit of final good – and the marginal utility
obtained by consuming this unit, i.e. the marginal rate of substitution between pollution
and consumption. Equivalently, that corresponds to the social cost of one unit of carbon
in terms of final good.
Next, the correspondence between the equilibrium characterizing condition (41) (resp.
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(42)) and the optimum characterizing condition (15) (resp. (16)) is achieved if and only if
σi,t is equal to 1 − γi, i = {B,E}, i.e. if both sectors are fully subsidized. These results
are summarized in Proposition 3 below.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium defined in Proposition 2 is optimal if and only if the triplet
of policies {σB,t, σE,t, τt}∞t=0 is such that σB,t = 1− γB, σE,t = 1− γE and τt = τ ot , for all
t ≥ 0.
Following Jones (1995), we set γB and γE equal to 0.3, so that optimal levels of re-
search grants in both sectors correspond to σB = σE = 0.7. Using the specified model as
introduced in Appendix A1, the first-best optimal carbon tax can be illustrated by Figure
2.
[Figure 2 here]
This tax τ ot starts from some low 5 US$ per ton of carbon and follows an inverted U-
shape trajectory, reaching around 90 US$ by 2100, 200$ in 250 years, before plummeting.
As we will see later, this carbon policy increases the delivered price of the resource, i.e.
the market price including the carbon tax (pmt ). We will see also that this more expensive
fossil energy provides strong incentives for adopting alternative energy supply.
5.2 Second-best analysis: an example
Proposition 3 gives the unique triplet of policies {σB,t, σE,t, τt}∞t=0 that restores the first-
best optimum; nevertheless, the model allows to characterize any second-best optimum. As
an illustration, assume that research cannot be subsidized at the first-best level (σi = 1−γi,
for i = {B,E}). Then, Figure 2 exhibits the second-best profile of the carbon tax in
two cases15: the case of zero-research grants (σi = 0) and the intermediate case where
σi = (1 − γi)/2 = 0.35. We observe that the lower the research subsidies, the higher the
second-best environmental tax. We do not develop this example any further and leave
the analysis of alternative second-best approaches for future work. Rather, we devote the
next section to the analysis of the key variables sensitivity to various public policies at the
equilibrium.
15The second-best tax comes from the maximization of the welfare subject to two types of constraints:
i) the decentralized equilibrium described in section 4 prevails and ii) research subsidies are not set at their
first-best levels.
16
6 Impacts of economic policies
In this section, we use the analytical model developed so far to conduct numerical simu-
lations. We appraise the impacts of environmental and research policies on all variables
– prices and quantities – in the decentralized equilibrium and we emphasize their trans-
mission channels. We proceed as follows. In sub-section 6.1, we compare the so-called
"laisser-faire" case (here after "LF"), that consists in determining the outcome in the de-
centralized economy without neither climate nor research policy, and the optimal outcome
of the model. In other words, starting from the equilibrium with any public policy, we ana-
lyze the effect of the simultaneous introduction of optimal environmental tax and research
grants. In order to quantify how sensitive are the economic variables to the environmental
policy, we next analyze in sub-section 6.2 the impacts of a carbon tax variation from 0 to
τ o on the equilibrium trajectories, given zero-research grants. In sub-section 6.3, given a
zero-carbon tax, we analyze how the trajectories evolve when i) σB and σE are simultane-
ously fixed at their first-best optimal levels; ii) either σB or σE is optimal while the other
one is set equal to 0, i.e. when the research policy focuses on a single sector, the remaining
one being not subsidized at all.
We adopt the following notations that will help us pointing at various facts when
describing graphs. ∆τ,σ|X stands for the change in variable X due to a simultaneous
increase of τ from 0 to τ o and of σB = σE from 0 to 0.7. Those changes are illustrated in
figures 3-7 by a shift from the "LF" trajectories to the "Optimum" trajectories. ∆τ |X is
the change of X due to an increase in τ from 0 to τ o, given σB = σE = 0 (i.e. shifts from
"LF" to "Opti tax" on the figures). Finally, given τ = τ o, ∆σB ,σE |X denotes the change
in variable X due to a simultaneous increase of σB and σE from 0 to 0.7, and ∆σi |X the
change in variable X due to an increase of σi from 0 to 0.7, with σj = 0, for i, j = {B,E}
and i 6= j (i.e. shifts from "LF" to "Opti subs.", "Subs. B" and "Subs. E", respectively).
Table 1 summarizes the findings from our sensitivity analysis conducted consequently, i.e.
provides the signs of the ∆.
6.1 Optimum vs laisser-faire
In both R&D sectors, as seen from Figure 3, the implementation of optimal policies clearly
translates into higher research investments and then, into much faster knowledge accumu-
lation: ∆τ,σ|Ri > 0 and ∆τ,σ|Hi > 0, for i = {B,E}. The innovation selling prices VHE ,t
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Optimum vs Environmental R&D policies
Laisser-faire policy
X ∆τ,σ|X ∆τ |X ∆σB ,σE |X ∆σB |X ∆σE |X
HB + +(weak) + + ∼
HE + ∼ + ∼ +
RB + + + + −
RE + +(weak) + − +
F − − − − −
B + + + + −
E + − + + +
T − − − − −
QG + − + + +
QN + first −, next + + + +
VHB + + + + −
VHE − ∼ − ∼ −
pmF + + − − −
psF − − − − −
pB − ∼ − − ∼
pE − + − − −
Table 1: Summary of economic policy effects
and VHB ,t follow diverging time-paths (see Figure 4): VHE ,t decreases over time, while
VHB ,t follows a reverse upward trend, at least for the first two centuries. The optimal
instruments shift the price of an innovation dedicated to energy efficiency below its laisser-
faire counterpart: ∆τ,σ|VHE < 0. Simultaneously, they shift the selling price of innovations
dedicated to the backstop production above the laisser-faire level: ∆τ,σ|VHB > 0. As will
be seen in sub-section 6.3, those results are caused by the R&D policies.
[Figures 3 and 4]
In the fossil fuel sector, the introduction of optimal policies implies a reduction of the
instantaneous flow of extraction: ∆τ,σ|F < 0 (see Figure 5(a)). The resource market price
increases, whereas its selling price diminishes: ∆τ,σ|pmF > 0 and ∆τ,σ|psF < 0 (see Figure
5(b)). This overall effect on fuel prices is mainly due to the environmental policy and will
be commented in sub-section 6.2.
[Figure 5]
In the backstop and energy sectors, the price of carbon-free energy pB,t, as well as of
final energy pE,t, is reduced: ∆τ,σ|pB < 0 and ∆τ,σ|pE < 0; their respective consumption
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Bt and Et are intensified, overriding the fossil use reduction: ∆τ,σ|B > 0 and ∆τ,σ|E > 0
(see Figure 6).
[Figure 6]
Finally, the optimal time-paths of temperature variation start diverging from the
laisser-faire case by the middle of the century: ∆τ,σ|T < 0 (see Figure 7(a)). In 2100,
the optimal temperature variation is 9.4% lower than the no-climate-policy case, reaching
almost 5 degrees in the very long run. The same observation holds for the net world prod-
uct QN (see Figure 7(b)): it is positively affected by optimal policies by the end of this
century, the most prominent benefit from the no-intervention case occurring only later on.
This benefit overshoots 2% only around 2130.
[Figure 7]
6.2 Sensitivity to environmental tax
As shown in Figure 3, the effect of the environmental tax on the specific investments in both
R&D sectors are positive: ∆τ |Ri > 0 for i = {B,E}. However, this effect is particularly
weak in the energy R&D sector. This implies, in the backstop R&D sector, a positive effect
on the accumulation of knowledge (∆τ |HB > 0), but, because of the relative inertia of the
discovery function H i, not significant enough to really confirm the robustness of the Porter
hypothesis (in the sense that environmental regulation does not stimulate green research).
We can just say that our model does not invalidate it. In the energy R&D sector, variations
of the carbon tax let quite unchanged the rhythm of knowledge accumulation: ∆τ |HE ≈ 0.
Moreover, the choice of the environmental tax affects positively the price of innovations in
the green research sector (∆τ |VHB > 0), but seems to have no impact on the prices in the
energy research sector (∆τ |VHE ≈ 0), as shown by Figure 4.
As far as the resource market is concerned, reinforcing the carbon tax level through-
out the entire time horizon is shifting the fossil fuel market price upward, and then the
resource use downward, as depicted in Figure 5: ∆τ |pmF > 0 and ∆τ |F < 0. However, it
is worth observing that the selling price of the fossil resource is decreasing: ∆τ |psF > 0.
This reduction implies a rent transfer from the resource-holder to the government. The
idea that environmental taxes generally imply some redistributive effects in addition to
the expected efficiency gains has already been evoked by economists, such as Nordhaus
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and Boyer (2000)16. Our framework provides an unambiguous characterization of those
redistributive effects and allows for the assessment of their extent.
Concerning the backstop sector, the backstop price reveals unaffected by the environ-
mental policies, i.e. ∆τ |pB ≈ 0, since its production cost – that partly depends on the
specific level of knowledge in the backstop R&D sector HB – remains fairly constant.
However, the demand for the backstop is stimulated by such policies (see Figure 6(a)):
∆τ |B > 0. Indeed, in the energy sector, since firms face a higher fossil fuel price, they sub-
stitute the backstop for the polluting resource. Nonetheless, this more intensive backstop
use is not sufficient to maintain the laisser-faire level of energy consumption (see Figure
6(b)): ∆τ |E < 0. This last result comes from the increase of the energy market price when
a carbon tax is levied on the fossil fuel use: ∆τ |pE > 0.
Finally, since this penalizes energy production – and thus final output production, ceteri
paribus – the gross product QG is reduced when an optimal carbon tax is implemented.
Moreover, the reduced carbon intensity of the global economy stemming from the carbon
tax policy, slows down the increase in the temperature variation as shown in Figure 7(a),
and in turn, reduces the environmental damage. The overall effect on the net world product
QN , as compared with the laisser-faire case, corresponds to a negative impact of the tax
until 2190, and a positive impact next. Such an environmental policy would thus generate
more net product in the short run only if it was initially combined with an appropriate
green research policy.
6.3 Sensitivity to research subsidies
When implementing a research policy, the regulator can act either on the sole energy
R&D sector, on the sole backstop R&D sector, or on both sectors simultaneously. Then,
a complete analysis of the effect of such a policy requires the dissociation of the joint
effects from the marginal ones on each sector. For this matter, we proceed to two kinds of
comparisons. For a given zero-level of carbon tax (i.e. τt = 0 for all t), we analyze how
the trajectories evolve when i) σE and σB are simultaneously increased from 0 to 0.7; ii)
16Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) justify the existence of a potential rent transfer by the fact that fossil
fuel availability is generally limited (i.e. resources are scarce) and their supply curves are relatively price-
inelastic. As they mention p.54, "In the limited case of perfectly price-inelastic supply of carbon-energy
with zero extraction costs, carbon taxes may have no economic effect at all and would simply redistribute
rents from the resource owners to the government". The situation described in our model is not so extreme
since the resource will never be exhausted given the specified extraction technology. Nevertheless, beyond
the efficiency effects, we still observe a rent effect.
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either σE or σB is modified while the other one is set to 0, i.e. when the research policy
focuses on a single sector, the remaining one being not subsidized at all.
Let us begin with the R&D sectors. We have previously noted (cf. sub-section 6.2)
that the environmental policy has only small effects on the level of knowledge. Thus, the
overall effect of optimal policies on R&D sectors, as mentioned in sub-section 6.1, should
be essentially due to the research policies. A simultaneous increase in σB and σE makes
the specific investments in both R&D sectors higher (see Figure 3) and thus, the knowledge
accumulation faster: ∆σB ,σE |Ri > 0 and ∆σB ,σE |Hi > 0, for i = {B,E}. However, if we
decompose the aggregate effect according to each sector, we observe that there is no cross-
sector effects: ∆σB ,σE |Ri ≈ ∆σi |Ri and ∆σj |Ri ≈ 0, for i, j = {B,E} and i 6= j. The same
observations apply to Hi.
The innovation selling prices being equal to the marginal costs of innovations, appre-
hending how they are affected by the optimal policy proves difficult. Contrary to the stock
of knowledge in each R&D sector, the innovation selling prices do not react the same way
to any research policy, as depicted in Figure 4: ∆σB ,σE |VHE < 0 and ∆σB ,σE |VHB > 0.
From (31) and appendix A1, we have:
VHi,t =
1
H iRi
=
Ri,t
biH i(Ri,t, Hi,t)
, for i = {B,E} .
For any i = {B,E}, both the numerator and the denominator of this ratio increase.
Nevertheless, when i = E, RE,t grows less than bEHE(.), which leads to a decrease of the
marginal cost of innovation in the energy R&D sector, along with its selling price VHE ,t.
Alternatively, when i = B, RB,t grows more than bBHB(.), which leads to the opposite
result. Those complex interactions stem from general equilibrium mechanisms.
Some further analysis of the R&D policy make the effect of each type of R&D subsidy
on the innovation selling prices clearer. First, ∆σE |VHE ≈ ∆σB ,σE |VHE and ∆σB |VHE ≈ 0:
there is no cross-sector effects on the energy R&D sector, i.e. σB has no effect on VHE ,t.
Second, ∆σB |VHB > ∆σB ,σE |VHB > 0 and ∆σE |VHB < 0. In this case, strong cross-sector
effects are occurring. When the only backstop R&D sector is subsidized, the increase in
the innovation selling price in backstop R&D is higher than the increase which is observed
when both R&D sectors are subsidized. Moreover, subsidizing the only energy R&D causes
the backstop innovation price to move in the opposite direction, i.e. to decrease.
In turn, we examine the simultaneous effects of research policies on the fossil fuel, the
backstop and the energy sectors, and we try to give some intuitions on the results. Since a
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simultaneous increase in σB and σE stimulates the knowledge accumulation in both sectors,
this directly reduces the production costs of the backstop and the energy services, as well as
their respective market prices pB and pE : ∆σB ,σE |pB < 0 and ∆σB ,σE |pE < 0. This implies
an increase in the backstop and energy productions: ∆σB ,σE |B > 0 and ∆σB ,σE |E > 0
(Figure 6). Since the backstop is relatively less costly than the fossil fuel (pB/pF decreases),
then the energy producers substitute the former for the latter: ∆σB ,σE |F < 0 (Figure
5(a)). The demand for the fossil fuel being reduced, its price decreases: ∆σB ,σE |pF < 0
(Figure 5(b)). Remark that an increase in σE reduces the backstop production, but leaves
its market price unchanged: ∆σE |B < 0 (which implies ∆σB |B > ∆σB ,σE |B > 0) and
∆σE |pB ≈ 0.
Finally, the temperature changes as well as the net final output (taking into account
environmental damages) are positively affected by a rise in energy subsidies in any sector
(see Figure 7).
7 Conclusion
This paper establishes the template of a climate change integrated assessment model, ca-
pable of defining the decentralized outcome, i.e. the equilibrium, of a given climate policy
architecture. One of the main features of the model lies in the analytical derivation of the
innovation prices. In our context, those innovations are dedicated to knowledge accumu-
lation in two sectors: the backstop energy sector and the energy efficiency sector. Since
knowledge is not embodied into intermediate goods, its price is defined in an alternative
way (as a part of its social value that is equal to the sum of its marginal profitabilities in
all sectors using it).
Another key feature of the model lies in its ability and suitability to assess various
economic policies. As the economy encompasses three market distortions, i.e. the pollution
from fossil resource consumption and the two research spillovers, two types of economic
policy instruments are implemented: a tax on the fossil fuel use and a research subsidy
for each R&D sector. As one obtains a distinct equilibrium for each vector of instruments,
we are able to test for any policy architectures, including suboptimal carbon taxes and
research subsidies. This should be of particular interest for studying second best policy in
the context of climate change mitigation.
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We use a calibrated version of the model to simulate the socially optimum outcome
and compare it to its laisser-faire counterpart in the decentralized economy. We assess the
impacts on all economic and environmental variables and characterize the efficiency of the
policy measures, and particularly the efficiency of the R&D funding that have to be devoted
to energy technologies. The laisser-faire situation results in some additional gross world
product losses of 1.6% in the long run, as compared to the socially desirable outcome. We
exhibit the significant influence of R&D activities aiming at reducing the polluting fossil
energy use. This setting advocates for higher subsidies dedicated to renewable energies,
and, to a lower extent, for subsidies aiming at improving energy efficiency. This mainly
comes from the underlying assumption on the potential improvements of energy efficiency
that are limited to 20%, suggesting that improvement in energy efficiency would rather
be a short term option for tackling the climate change issue, while bringing the backstop
energy to the market is more beneficial in the longer term.
The natural extension of the model will consist in introducing a richer set of climate
mitigation options such as the possibility of capturing and storing the carbon in geological
formations. One might also introduce biofuel energy, the feedstock then encompassing
the features of a renewable resource. The specificities of nuclear energy may also be
incorporated in our model. The flexibility of the tool at hand allows for the modeling
of specific knowledge stocks for each of the energy supply technologies.
Finally, the calibration of this model may require some further adjustment. In this re-
spect, alternative functional forms may be experienced (See Nordhaus’s comment on Stern
review and the accompanying data update – Nordhaus, 2007). Moreover, as suggested by
the IPCC report (IPCC, 2000), a number of plausible scenarios may arise in the future. The
DICE model calibration may be revised so as to match more closely the GDP projections
of other long term studies. In particular, it would be worthwhile analyzing the effects of
a more sustained long term growth. An enhanced world economic growth would turn into
more intensive fossil energy use, at least in the early decades where the renewable energy
does not exhibit sufficient cost reduction. Besides the increased externality resulting from
more rapid climate change, the modified economically recoverable resource base may, in
turn, confront us to lower fossil resource availabilities in the long run. The effect on the
fossil fuel prices and the incentive for increased investment in clean energy R&D deserves
some further investigation.
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Appendix
A1. Analytical specification and calibration of the model
To characterize analytically our model, we use a mix of functional forms considered in the
DICE and ENTICE-BR models:
Q(K,E,L,A) = AKγEβL1−γ−β, with β, γ ∈ (0, 1)
gi =
(
gi0
di
)(
1− e−dit
)
, with di > 0, ∀i = {A,L}
E(HE , F,B) =
[
(αHHE)ρH + (F ρB +BρB )
ρH
ρB
] 1
ρH , with αH , ρH , ρB ∈ (0, 1)
H i(Ri, Hi) = aiRbii H
φi
i , with ai > 0, and bi, φi ∈ [0, 1], ∀i = {E,B}
D(T ) =
1
1 + a1T + a2T 2
, with a1 < 0 and a2 > 0
U(C) = k1L log
(
C
L
)
+ k2, with k1, k2 > 0
Φ(G) = 1
log(G/2)
log 2
+O(t),
where O(t) = 3t− 4 for t < t¯, O(t) = 5 otherwise, i > 0, i = 1, 5. We also consider the
following production functions:
F (QF , Z) =
QF
cF + αF × (Z/Z¯)ηF , with cF , αF , ηF > 0
B(QB, HB) = QB × H
ηB
B
αB
, with αB, ηB > 0.
For numerical computations, we use the same values of exogenous parameters as in the
ENTICE-BR model 17. Since we have transformed the cost functions of fossil fuel and
backstop into production functions, we also specify the parameters of these production
functions in such a way that the calibration of the ENTICE-BR model still applies to our
model. Finally, we consider a finite time horizon starting at date t0 = 1990 and ending at
T = t0 + 350.
17For the sake of simplicity, the exogenous land use emissions have been omitted. Those emissions are
likely small (see Nordhaus, 2007) and would alter neither our qualitative nor our quantitative results.
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A2. Proof of Proposition 1
Let H be the discounted value of the Hamiltonian of the optimal program (we drop time
subscripts for notational convenience):
H = U(C)e−
∫ t
0 ρds + λD(T )Q {K,E [HE , F (QF , Z), B(QB, HB)]}
−λ
(
C +QF +QB +
∑
i
Ri + δK
)
+
∑
i
νiH
i(Ri, Hi)
+µG(αF − ζG) + µT [Φ(G)−mT ] + ηF.
The associated first order conditions are:
∂H
∂C
= U ′(C)e−
∫ t
0 ρds − λ = 0 (51)
∂H
∂QF
= λ[D(T )QEEFFQF − 1] + αµGFQF + ηFQF = 0 (52)
∂H
∂QB
= λ[D(T )QEEBBQB − 1] = 0 (53)
∂H
∂Ri
= −λ+ νiH iRi = 0, i = {B,E} (54)
∂H
∂K
= λ[D(T )QK − δ] = −λ˙ (55)
∂H
∂Hi
= λD(T )QEEHi + νiH
i
Hi = −ν˙i, i = {B,E} (56)
∂H
∂G
= −ζµG + µTΦ′(G) = −µ˙G (57)
∂H
∂T
= λD′(T )Q−mµT = −µ˙T (58)
∂H
∂Z
= λD(T )QEEFFZ + αµGFZ + ηFZ = −η˙ (59)
and the transversality conditions are:
lim
t→∞λK = 0 (60)
lim
t→∞ νiHi = 0, i = {B,E} (61)
lim
t→∞µGG = 0 (62)
lim
t→∞µTT = 0 (63)
lim
t→∞ ηZ = 0 (64)
First, we show how to obtain condition (12), the less evident one. From (52), we have:
αµG + η = −λ [D(T )QEEFFQF − 1]
FQF
,
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where λ = U ′(C)e−
∫ t
0 ρds from (51). Substituting this expression into (59) and after sim-
plifications, we get the following differential equation:
η˙ = − FZ
FQF
U ′(C)e−
∫ t
0 ρds.
Integrating this expression and using transversality condition (64), we obtain:
η =
∫ ∞
t
FZ
FQF
U ′(C)e−
∫ s
0 ρduds. (65)
From (51) and (58), we have:
µ˙T = mµT −D′(T )QU ′(C)e−
∫ t
0 ρds.
Solution of such a differential equation is given by:
µT = emt
[
µT,0 −
∫ t
0
D′(T )QU ′(C)e−(ms+
∫ s
0 ρdx)ds
]
.
Using (63), this expression becomes:
µT = emt
∫ ∞
t
D′(T )QU ′(C)e−(ms+
∫ s
0 ρdx)ds =
∫ ∞
t
D′(T )QU ′(C)e−[m(s−t)+
∫ s
0 ρdx]ds.
(66)
Now, let us consider condition (57). Using transversality condition (62), this differential
solution is solved for:
µG = eζt
∫ ∞
t
µTΦ′(G)e−ζsds =
∫ ∞
t
µTΦ′(G)e−ζ(s−t)ds, (67)
where µT is defined by (66).
Finally, condition (12) is equivalent to condition (52) when replacing λ, µG and η by
their expressions coming from (51), (67) and (65) respectively, and dividing each side of
the equation by FQF .
Second, the characterizing condition (13) is directly provided by (53). To continue,
remark that (51) implies:
λ˙
λ
=
U˙ ′(C)
U ′(C)
− ρ. (68)
Then, condition (14) is simply obtained from (55) and (68).
Finally, differentiating (54) with respect to time and using (13), (56) and (68), we get
the characterizing conditions (15) and (16), which concludes the proof.
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A3. Proof of proposition 2
The first characterizing condition (38) is obtained by replacing η into (22) by its expression
coming from (25) and by noting that psF = pEEF − τ from (20), where pE = D(T )QE
from (18). Second, combining (27), (21) and (18) leads to condition (39). Next, using (17)
and (37), we directly get condition (40). Finally, the differentiation of (31) with respect to
time leads to:
V˙Hi
VHi
= −H˙
i
Ri
H iRi
, i = {B,E} .
Substituting this expression into (30) and using (28), (31) and (32), it comes:
r = −H˙
i
Ri
H iRi
+ (γi + σi)H iRi
(
viHi +
H iHi
H iRi
)
, ∀i = {B,E} .
We thus obtain the two last characterizing equilibrium conditions (41) and (42) by replac-
ing into this last equation vBHB and v
E
HE
by their expressions coming from (34) and (33)
respectively.
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Figure 1: Description of the model
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Figure 2: Optimal carbon taxes
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a) Investment in backstop R&D: RB
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b) Investment in energy R&D: RE
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Figure 3: Effect of public policies on research investments
a) Price of innovation in backstop R&D sector: VHB
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b) Price of innovation in energy R&D sector: VHE
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Figure 4: Effect of public policies on innovation selling prices
a) CO2-equivalent fossil fuel use: F
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
19
21
1995 2035 2075 2115 2155 2195 2235
b i
l l .
 t o
n s
LF Optimum Opti tax Opti subs. Subs. B Subs. E
b) Fossil fuel market and selling price: pF
m and pF
s
270
320
370
420
470
520
570
1995 2035 2075 2115 2155 2195 2235
1 9
9 0
 U
S D
LF Optimum Opti tax Opti subs.
Subs. B Subs. E Selling pr (opti) Selling pr (tax)
Figure 5: Effect of public policies on the fossil fuel sector
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a) CO2-equivalent backstop use: B
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b) CO2-equivalent energy use: E
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Figure 6: Effect of public policies on the backstop and energy use
a) Temperature increase from the 1990 level: T
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b) Variations (in %) of final output (QN) from LF
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Figure 7: Effect of public policies on atmospheric temperature and the final input
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